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SALES-SERVICE HYBRID TRANSACTIONS: A
POLICY APPROACH
by Steve Brook
The doctrine of liability without fault in consumer transactions is a complex
creature. At base, it is a tort; but circumspect use of the word "tort" is de-
manded. "Broadly speaking, a tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of
contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action
for damages."' As will be shown, liability without fault is broader still; not
only does it partake of contract, but this "tort" is less concerned with wrong
than with remedy. 2 Indeed, this creature charts a path of social re-evaluation
wherein a search for a "wrong" regresses, avoiding the crucial decision:
When a seller has marketed a defective product which injures a user, or even
a bystander, who is, or could be, most prepared to absorb the costs?3
Simply put, liability without fault dictates that an injured consumer need
not prove the seller's negligence. Rather, it is enough that the seller markets
a defective product that causes injury,4 regardless of whether the seller was
or was not negligent in his production or sale of the product.
A limitation has been placed on the doctrine in an attempt by the courts
to distinguish between sales and service transactions, limiting the doctrine to
the pure sales transactions involving tangible products, normally chattels. If
the "product" carrying the potential risks from defects was a service, for ex-
ample, the repair of equipment 5 or the application of hair dye in a beauty
shop,6 the plaintiff has been forced to prove a failure by this "seller" to use
reasonable care. More recently, a plaintiff has been allowed to rely on liabil-
ity without fault in transactions involving tangible products-transfers such
as the bailment or rental of automobiles-which could be -termed "quasi-
sales" or transfers less than a sale. 7 Transactions ranging from the rendering
of professional opinions to these "quasi-sales" have been considered for the
application of the liability without fault doctrine.
Beginning with the premise that this doctrine is more of a remedy for an
injury than a redress of a wrong, this Comment will attempt to show that
rather than precise characterizations of the type of transaction, emphasis
should be placed upon an assessment, in each general category of transaction,
of the policy basis for the application or the non-application of liability with-
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (4th ed. 1971).
2. See Pound, Philosophy of Law and Comparative Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1951).
3. As developed in this Comment, "absorb" means a two-step process wherein the
manufacturer assumes the initial costs (reallocation) and then passes them on to his
other customers in the market place, ideally, the public at large (redistribution).
4. Cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
5. See, e.g., Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833
(Alas. 1967).
6. See, e.g., Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. Fair-
fax Co. 1963).
7. See cases cited notes 121-33 infra.
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out fault. These essential policy considerations are: justified reliance of the
buyer on the seller; marketing responsibility of the seller; and the seller's abil-
ity to redistribute the burden acquired.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT
A. Theories of the Doctrine
The doctrine of products liability without fault has been referred to as strict
liability as well as implied warranty. It is doubtful, when properly applied,
that these two theories or approaches should be treated differently.8 Each
imposes a special duty on the seller that he bear and redistribute the costs
of injuries arising from defective products, but neither requires privity of con-
tract between the seller and the user or consumer9 or proof of negligence.
Implied Warranty. Both the Uniform Commercial Code10 and its predeces-
sor, the Uniform Sales Act 1 have codified the theory of implied warranty
on sales transactions.' 2 Yet, warranties based upon express representations 13
or implied by the sale of the product pre-date either statute. 14 The Uniform
Sales Act limited the warranties implied in the sale of goods to that of fitness
for a particular purpose, if such purpose is made known to the seller,15 and
that of merchantable quality for goods bought by description from a dealer
8. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Cor,., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191
N.E.2d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963).
9. Compare RESTATEMENT § 402A, with TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.318(1967), and Thermal Supply of Texas, Inc. v. Asel, 468 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1971). See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, and Comment 3.
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314 (merchantable quality), 2-315 (fitness
for a particular purpose).
11. UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 15(1), (2).
12. Under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106(1), "[a] 'sale' consists in the
passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price ....... The title passed is one
to goods, i.e., existing movables other than investment securities and money. Id. §§ 2-
105, -106.
13. Recovery under liability without fault in an express warranty is a possibility.
See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, a!f'd on rehearing, 15 P.2d
1118 (1932), afl'd on other grounds, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934). But, as
Dean Prosser pointed out, there are definite limitations on the scope of recovery such
as proof of an assertion of a fact, the falsity of which relates to the proximate cause
of the injury. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 651-53. It would seem that in the area
of personal injury, implied warranty is a more all-encompassing category.
14. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(2) "was copied almost verbatim from the first part
of Section 14(2) of the English Sale of Goods Act of 1894 [sic], which was itself a
restatement and codification of the common law of England as it existed at that date."
Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117 (1943).
But cf. Note, Product Liability and the English Implied Terms Bill: Transatlantic
Variations on a Theme, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 185, 186 (1973) (suggesting that in fact
the existing common law was in a state of flux and the Act of 1893 was in some re-
spects more liberal than the contemporary case law).
Originally, breach of warranty arose out of tort, was based on misrepresentation, and
was similar to deceit. But, the action has since developed on its own, separate from
tort, as an implication of law; the warranty exists irrespective of the seller's intent to
be bound. It should not be predicated upon proof of express reliance on the seller.
Prosser, supra, at 118, 121-22, 168.
15. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(1): "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,
makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and
it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purposes."
[Vol. 28
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in such goods. 16 The Uniform Commercial Code incorporated these war-
ranties, 17 but in addition, recognized the possibility of similar warranties ex-
isting outside the statute by a comment to the express warranty section:
"[T]he warranty sections of [Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code]
are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which
have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts
or to direct parties to such contracts."' 8  Additionally, privity of contract is
usually not a requirement in products liability cases involving personal injury
or property damage under implied warranty.' 9
While other justifications can be found,20 it would appear that the strongest
rationale for the application of implied warranty is simply an implied-in-law
promise or obligation of the seller of any defective product to indemnify the
injured plaintiff. 2' The law would justify this obligation as a duty of society
16. Id. § 15(2): "Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who
deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality."
And, under id. § 15(5), trade usage might also give rise to a warranty of fitness or
quality.
17. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 is the successor provision of the UNI-
FORM SALES ACT § 15(2). Section 2-314 deals with an implied warranty of merchant-
ability.
Section 2-314(1) reads as follows: "Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serv-
ing for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is
a sale."
Section 2-314(2)(c) defines merchantability and includes the term "fit for the ordi-
nary purposes for which such goods are used."
Section 2-314(3) provides for implied warranties arising out of trade usage and the
course of dealings.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315 is the successor provision of the UNIFORM
SALES ACT §§ 15(1), (4), (5). Section 2-315 reads as follows: "Where the seller at
the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods
are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under [§ 2-316] an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose."
See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-6, -9 (1972).
18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 2. This comment is a most
frequently cited argument for the extension of warranties analogous to the Code provi-
sions into non-sales transactions. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 9-
6, at 287 n.47; Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 653, 655 (1957); Note, Sales and Service Warranties in Blood Transfu-
sions, 26 MD. L. REV. 182, 191 (1966).
19. See Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (a landmark case which dealt with cinder blocks). Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, it is an open question how distant one may be from the
sale. The Code offered three alternatives. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318,
Comment 3. Texas, which adopted the Code in 1967, left the issue up to the courts:
This chapter does not provide whether anyone other than a buyer may
take advantage of an express or implied warranty of quality made to the
buyer or whether the buyer or anyone entitled to take advantage of a war-
ranty made to the buyer may sue a third party other than the immediate
seller for def'ciencies in the quality of the goods. These matters are left
to the courts for their determination.
TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.318 (1967). See Thermal Supply of Texas, Inc.
v. Asel, 468 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971): "Traditionally, privity
of contract was a necessary prerequisite to a suit on implied warranty. However, in
the products liability cases involving harm to the user or consumer or to his property,
the requirement of privity has been dispensed with."
20. Prosser, supra note 14, at 122-25.
21. Id., at 124-25; cf. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150
P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
1974]
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to an individual22 and the seller is the conduit of this protection because of
his marketing responsibility.
Strict Liability. Paralleling the growth of implied warranty was the develop-
ment of a tortious liability for the sale of defective products. 28  At first, a
products liability tort action was had for negligence, 24 but express and implied
warranties provided sufficient analogy to allow courts to establish a tort basis
for liability absent a showing of negligence, i.e., strict liability.25 The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, section 402A, codified the strict liability doc-
trine.20  The Restatement justified or established strict liability as a special
responsibility created by the marketing of the product. This responsibility
is based upon the favorable social policy of allowing the consuming public
to rely on the goods. Moreover, the protection of the individual injured from
the costs of such injury should be effected by the redistribution of the risk
to the general public through the medium of the marketer or producer who
sets the price.27
22. Pound, supra note 2, at 8.
23. As discussed in note 14 supra, the concept of implied warranty may be a tort
idea, but the theory of strict liability has a pure tort heritage.
24. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Thomas
v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 396 (1852).
Privity was not at issue in a tort action for personal injury founded upon negligence:[T]he absence of 'privity' between the parties makes it difficult to found
any duty to the plaintiff upon the contract itself. But by entering into a
contract with A, the defendant may place himself in such a relation to-
ward B that the law will impose upon him an obligation, sounding in tort
and not in contract, to act in such a way that B will not be injured. Theincidental fact of the existence of the contract with A does not negative
the responsibility of the [defendant] ....
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 93, at 622.
25. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
While warranty may arise in either tort or contract, and should need no actual con-
tract, still, contract problems such as privity, disclaimer, and notice of breach of war-
ranty have tended to affix themselves to the term "implied warranty." Much of thisproblem arose under the Uniform Sales Act. The term "strict liability" should not bear
the same connotation, although the theory of a legally imposed duty without fault o-nthe seller or the supplier remains the same. See Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124-34 (1960).
The term "strict liability" set forth in the Greenman decision was regarded as the
more accurate of the liability without fault terms, including the implied warranty withoutprivity of contract term, used by the New York Court of Appeals. Goldberg v. Kolls-
man Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595(1963).
26. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Con-
sumer(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liabil-ity for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
_ESTATEMENT § 402A.
27. Cf. id. § 402A, comment c.
[Vol. 28
COMMENTS
Sellers not normally dealing in the type of goods sold are exempt from strict
liability under the Restatement.28  It is important to note, however, that the
rationale for this exemption is not that the transaction is not a sale or that
the transferor is not a "seller" so much as the fact that the situation lacks
any basis for justified reliance on such products. 29
This concept of reliance is not to be taken as a proof element for strict
liability, or for the implied warranty of merchantability. It is rather an as-
sumption made by the law, upon which the liability without fault doctrine
and its theories are built. This reliance is intimately connected with the con-
cept of marketing responsibility; the law presumes that a buyer will rely on
the seller's judgment in manufacturing or stocking a product.30
A Comparison. Both implied warranty and strict liability were created to
deal with obvious sales transactions in which a manufacturer placed an article
on the market "knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,"
and the product proved "to have a defect that causes injury to a human be-
ing.",3 1 Absent the user's misuse or assumption of the risk, liability will ensue
when a defective product leaves the manufacturer's hands and proximately
causes an injury. While this language is adopted from a strict liability test,
approximately the same standards would apply for the implied warranty of
merchantability, or merchantable quality. The difference would be the sub-
stitution of the term "non-merchantable" for the word "defective," 32 and the
28. Id., comment f.
29. Id.; cf. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637, 638 (1968)(Botter, J., dissenting), aff'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
30. See Prosser, supra note 14, at 122-25, 148-49; RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment
C.
31. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963) (strict liability; the court notes however that implied war-
ranties arise outside of a contract for sale; but, apparently, these warranties have been
overburdened with the conceptualizations applicable to the implied warranty provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code; therefore, the liability without fault doctrine should
be placed squarely on strict liability); see Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106
Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (Ct. App. 1958). This decision was relied on in Green-
man. Markovich was a permanent wave injury case, where the user was not in priv-
ity with the manufacturer. The court there held that implied warranty could be estab-
lished on the basis of advertising practices of the defendant. Markovich in turn relied
on a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, which had allowed on the same basis an ex-
press warranty without privity of contract. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167
Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
32. Under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2) "merchantable" is given
several definitions; perhaps the most applicable here are the following:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; ....
The RESTATEMENT § 402A uses the term "defective condition unreasonably dangerous"
which, according to some commentators, is a narrower test than that afforded by the
merchantability concept. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 9-8, at 295. Cer-
tainly, it would seem that a product which causes injuries to persons or property would
not be fit for the ordinary purposes for which the product is used. But, in using this
concept, the totality of the purpose must be considered. For example, a rotary lawn
mower which unquestionably cuts grass can be defective if the blade is hazardously ex-
posed. Cf. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
Therefore, under an implied warranty, the purpose must be the entire operation of lawn
mowing; a purpose not fulfilled if the operator is injured by the machine, absent misuse.
1974]
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possibility that in some cases certain contract defenses could be interposed,
especially under a specific application of the Uniform Commercial Code. 5
The Rationale. It is apparent that three factors can be isolated in the appli-
cation of liability without fault: reliance on the seller; the seller's marketing
responsibility; and the seller's ability to pass his cost along to his customers
who compose a segment of society as a whole.
As has already been suggested, the assumption of reliance upon the safety
of the product manufactured or stocked is simply a legal presumption3 4
which seems to be premised on the notion that inherent justice dictates the
assignment of the cost of injury to the person who made the profit on the
sale of the product. s5 However, reliance may become relevant in the crea-
tion of liability where the consumer is urged through the medium of advertis-
ing to rely on a seller's or quasi-seller's skill or judgment; or conversely, to
negate liability if the seller's art is only an opinion service. If by a sense
of justice, reallocation can be grounded upon marketing responsibility, the
seller must be in a position to redistribute the additional costs. Liability with-
out fault is not a just vengeance upon the seller; rather, it is a social concept
by which society bears the loss for an individual's injury.
The application of these policies can be readily observed in the illustrative
case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,36 where the plaintiff's wife
purchased a home wood-working machine as a present for the plaintiff. The
machine, when put into use, kicked out a piece of wood injuring the plaintiff.
Although the jury found the defendant, the manufacturer, negligent in the
construction of the product, and also found a breach of an express warranty,
the defendant pleaded a bar to the warranty action through the failure of
the plaintiff to give notice of the injury. The California Supreme Court ap-
peared to rest its decision for the plaintiff first on the concept of an implied
warranty arising outside the contract, and then, renaming the warranty con-
cept strict liability, resting the holding in tort87 and liability without fault.
A potential liability arose when the product was placed on the market, the
recognition of which being a matter of law and not of contractual agreement.
Thus, privity was not at issue. Through the label of implied warranty or
strict liability, the resultant processes are the same, and the true basis of the
action is in tort. Since the reliance is a legal presumption from the marketing
33. Cf. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 525 P.2d 88 (1974).
It may be observed that on the whole, the Uniform Commercial Code implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose is narrower than the merchantability concept,
chiefly because the seller must have been found to have known the buyer's purpose and
to have been aware that the buyer was relying on the seller's judgment; additionally, the
buyer must have actually relied. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 9-9, at 297.
This is not to say that the particular purpose warranty will play no part, as by analogy,
in the expansion of liability without fault, especially if the reliance upon the quasi-seller
is found to be substantial. Cf. Texas State Optical, Inc. v. Barbee, 417 S.W.2d 750,
752 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967) (dissenting opinion).
34. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
35. Pound, The Problem of the Exploding Bottle, 40 B.U.L. REv. 167, 185-86
(1960).
36. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
37. Cf. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d




of the product, the plaintiff need not prove that he even tacitly relied on any
representations of the seller. As to the burden assumed, the court implied
that the costs were to be borne by the manufacturer and ultimately to be
redistributed to society by way of the manufacturer's customers. This policy
seemed consistent with an earlier concurring opinion written by Justice Tray-
nor in which he said: "The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health
may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured . . . [but] the
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business."38
Upon these three factors-reliance, marketing responsibility, and the cus-
tomer redistribution base-should be gauged the further application of lia-
bility without fault in those transactions extending beyond the pure sales type
which are expressly governed by the Restatement or the Uniform Commercial
Code; these other transactions are the hybrid sales-service types. In some
cases the service provided is of a degree of social necessity to force the fore-
closing of the strict liability or implied warranty avenues where otherwise the
increased costs produced through the effects of redistribution would deny
access to essential services to a large portion of the public.
B. Basis for the Sales-Service Dichotomy
Sales. Strict liability in tort under the Restatement section 402A specifically
concerns those in the business of selling particular goods.3 9 As has been sug-
gested, the occasional seller is exempted from strict liability-because he is
not in the business of placing goods on the market, he engenders neither mar-
keting responsibility nor reliance on his product. 40  The view has been ex-
pressed however that the supposed limitation to a "seller" under the Restate-
ment is merely the description "of the situation that has most commonly
arisen rather than . . a deliberate limitation of the principle to cases where
the product has been sold, intentionally excluding instances where a manufac-
turer has placed a defective article in the stream of commerce by other
means."
41
38. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 441(1944) (concurring opinion of Traynor, J.) (relied upon in Greenman). This opinion
indicated as well that the implication of strict liability should have a deterrent effect;
however, it would seem that in cases where there is no reason to suppose negligence,
deterrence is at best secondary to the prophylactic nature of the doctrine. See generally
Pound, supra note 35.
39. RESTATEMENT § 402A is entitled "Special Liability of Seller of Product for
Physical Harm to User or Consumer." See id. comment f, which analogizes to the seller
under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
RESTATEMENT § 402A is within chapter 14 of the Restatement, which concerns the
broader category of "supplier." The Scope Note to Topic 1 of chapter 14 states that§ 402A is "[a] special rule of strict liability applicable to sellers of articles for consump-
tion." In RESTATEMENT § 388, comment c, a "supplier" is defined as "any person who
for any purpose or in any manner gives possession of a chattel for another's use, or who
permits another to use or occupy it while it is in his own possession or control, without
disclosing his knowledge that the chattel is dangerous for the use for which it is supplied
or for which it is permitted to be used." The comment goes on to make the general
rule for suppliers apply to sellers, lessors, donors, lenders, bailors, and those undertaking
repair intending a subsequent redelivery. From this it would seem that § 402A is specif-
ically applicable to a defined and narrowed class of suppliers called "sellers."
40. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT § 402A,
comment f.
41. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1964).
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Under implied warranty of the Uniform Commercial Code, as has been
stated, there is specific reference to the possibility of non-sales implied war-
ranties arising outside of the Code, 42 although the Code provisions are them-
selves drawn in terms of sales. 43  Since the Code concepts looked initially
to the common law and recognized application of warranties outside express
statutory law, there would seem to be little reason to restrict the concept of
implied warranties to those cases arising specifically within the Code. It may
also be that the Code's definition of "merchant" 44 admits of a broader mean-
ing than the term "seller" in the Restatement.45
Service. While the trend in pure sales has certainly been towards open-
ing the liability without fault doctrine to the injured plaintiff, the basic rule
in service transactions has been to deny recovery absent proof of negligence.
Historically, the basis of the sales-service distinction has been found in tests
created to determine whether a transaction was a sale for the application of
the Statute of Frauds,46 differentiating the pure sale from services or work
done. The "essence" test of English origin is apparently the most persuasive
today, and as the name implies it premises the sales or service classification
upon the essential nature of the transaction. 47
The continuum from the tangible product sold on the store shelf to the
opinion rendered for a fee in the doctor's or lawyer's office-the spectrum
of the sales-service issue-is impossible to segment precisely. Generally, the
service transaction involves the application of a professional skill, such as the
opinion of a soil tester.48  However, the skill may be entirely incidental to
42. See note 12 supra.
43. See note 17 supra.
44. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104(1): "'Merchant' means a person whodeals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as havingknowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent orbroker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill."
45. Compare the definition of "merchant" set out at note 44 supra, with the RE-
STATEMENT § 402A, comment f, which analogizes the seller under § 402A with the mer-
chant under the Code. However, comment f also defines the seller as "any person en-gaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption."The Code's merchant is one who either deals in goods, or holds himself out as having
"knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-104 (emphasis supplied). "The second description, having to do with occupa-
tion, knowledge, and skill, includes electricians, plumbers, carpenters, boat builders, and
the like .... ." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 9-6, at 289.46. Use of the Statute of Frauds tests for the application of the strict liability doc-
trine is questionable. "[W]hen the Statute of Frauds itself is not an issue, the tests usedfor determining whether someone has complied with its provisions should be irrelevant,
the policy questions being different." Note, supra note 18, at 185.47. See Farnsworth, supra note 18, at 662-65; Note, Products and the Professional:Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 111, 113-15(1972); Note, supra note 18, at 183-84.
Most American courts have applied the "essence test" either to categorize
the entire transaction as a sale or to deny recovery for breach of warranty.
As a consequence, the implication of a warranty makes the transaction
subject to sales rules generally, and it is impossible to imply a warranty as
to the materials supplied without also implying strict liability for the ser-
vice and labor. It is questionable whether the "essence test" is applied in
the expanding area of implied warranty with the same rigor with which it
is under the Statute of Frauds.
Farnsworth, supra note 18, at 664.
48. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
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the gist of the transaction, such as a bailment.49 Between these two points,
lies the more nebulous sales-service area, such as the application of permanent
wave solutions to a patron in a beauty shop, a skill applied to a product. 50
A recent approach to the problem of categorization of the hybrid transactions
under the "no-fault" sales rule or the negligence-only service rule has been
to assess the commercial nature of the service rendered. A so-called com-
mercial venture as, for example, the beauty shop applying a hair preparation
which proves defective, may incur liability without fault, whereas a doctor
applying the same treatment may not incur this liability.51 Under the so-
called "stream of commerce" theory, the placing of the produce on the market
or into the consumer's hands is an essentially commercial as opposed to pro-
fessional capacity and such activity may result in liability.52 Although the
commercial transaction concept has been useful in differentiating points on
the sales-service continuum, it would appear that in some sense the profes-
sional is held to a lesser standard because of the inexact nature of his "prod-
uct"-an opinion or judgment. Granted, more often than not, the commer-
cial-professional dichotomy aligns the cases in an orderly pattern within the
general policy considerations of liability without fault, the failure to rely spe-
cifically on these policy considerations on a case-by-case basis had led to
some rather questionable results, as will be seen.
II. SERVICE AND SALES-SERVICE TRANSACTIONS
A. A General Approach
Concurrent with the development, chiefly in the late 1950's and 1960's,
of liability without fault in the sale of defective chattels, the rule of service
transactions was, and for pure service still is, that recovery for injuries to per-
son or property is limited to proof of negligence.
Service Transactions. The California Supreme Court formulated this rule in
the leading case of Gagne v. Bertran,53 in which the defendant, a soil tester
hired by the plaintiff, failed to discover the true depth of the filled soil on
a lot, which resulted in greatly increased building costs for the plaintiff.54
The court, while holding that there was sufficient evidence to establish a
cause of action in negligence, denied an action in implied warranty:
49. Cf. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965).
50. See, e.g., Karl Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 481 P.2d 924 (Wash. Ct. App.
1971).
51. Cf. Note, supra note 47, at 116-17.
52. See Phipps, When Does a "Service" Become a "Sale"?, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 274,
278 (1972). "This distinction refers . . . to the overall essence of the transaction and
its effect in terms of commercial realities." Id. at 281.
53. 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
54. Even had there been a strict liability approach, it may be doubtful that the
plaintiff here could have recovered since there was only an economic loss and no damage
to person or property. The majority rule in the strict liability area disallows recovery
under that theory for pure economic loss. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.
2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Casey, 472 S.W.2d 598
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971). Contra, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J.
52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
1974]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The services of experts are sought because of their special skill. They
have a duty to exercise the ordinary skill and competence of members
of their profession, and a failure to discharge that duty will subject them
to liability for negligence. Those who hire such persons are not justified
in expecting infallibility, but can expect only reasonable care and com-
petence. They purchase service, not insurance. 55
This case demonstrates the general precept "that those who sell their services
for the guidance of others in their economic, financial, and personal affairs
are not liable in the absence of negligence or intentional misconduct."56
Sales-Service Hybrid. In Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital,57 decided in
the same year as Gagne, the New York Court of Appeals denied recovery
under implied warranty provisions of the Uniform Sales Act in a hybrid trans-
action. The plaintiff, injured by a transfusion of blood infected with serum
hepatitis, sued the hospital in which the transfusion occurred. The New
York court held that the contract between the patient and the hospital was
an indivisible contract for services even where a separate figure could be as-
certained for the purchases of a product, in this case blood. Neither was
a distinction to be drawn between the hospital's act of supplying the blood
and the physician's professional service of administering the blood. The en-
tire indivisible contract was a service. "It has long been recognized that,
when service predominates, and transfer of personal property is but an inci-
dental feature of the transaction, the transaction is not deemed a sale within
the Sales Act."58 Recovery could be had only upon proof of negligence.
It is apparent that, although the rule applied is the same in Gagne and
Perlmutter, the situations are quite dissimilar. Gagne involved a mere opin-
ion rendered on the nature of the property purchased in a separate transac-
tion. The professional opinion itself and not the property involved was de-
fective. In Perlmutter an actual product was transferred, in contrast to the
"productless" service function in Gagne. While each case did involve an ele-
ment of professionalism, in Gagne the potential liability of the defendant was
premised upon his peculiar skill, while in Perlmutter it was premised upon
the defective product. Thus, the negligence-only rule is applied in Perlmut-
ter to an actual sale with the cloak of a service-predominated surrounding.
B. The First Exception to the General Rule
It is not surprising that the reluctance of the courts to apply implied war-
ranty or strict liability to hybrid transactions as illustrated by the rules of
Gagne and Perlmutter was first marked by an exception in the area of food
service. The growth of the liability without fault concept itself seems to be
traceable to regulation of food processors and vendors.59 Early in the twen-
tieth century, it was established that food se4ved in a restaurant was
deemed to be the object of a sale and that there was an implied warranty
55. 275 P.2d at 21.
56. Id. at 20.
57. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
58. Id. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
59. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 650; RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment b.
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of wholesomeness which was actionable without proof of negligence. The
court in the leading case of Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co.6 0 felt that it was
incongruous to give a warranty on food to be carried away, and yet, to deny
the warranty for food eaten on the premises.61  In a later case62 the same
court noted that in Friend the warranty arose out of the contract, but a war-
ranty of fitness and a subsequent action on a warranty would arise whether
the transaction was a sale within the terms of the Sales Act, or a service by
the innkeeper of providing food to be eaten.
While most courts were willing to apply this exception, 8 the general rule
of negligence reigned in the hybrid transactions.
III. THE MODERN HYBRID
On the continuum of sales-service problems, there would seem to be little
doubt as to the applicable theories at the extremes of pure sale and pure opin-
ion service; and the liability without fault doctrine and the negligence-only
rule, respectively, will obtain. The middle region involves hybrid transac-
tions featuring characteristics of both sale and service. In recent years there
has been a marked trend toward the placement of other hybrids in the "no-
fault" category. Among the valid policies for -the extension of the "no-fault"
category are consumer reliance, marketing responsibility, and the basis or
ability for redistribution of the costs.
A. The Current Approaches
Pure Service Transactions. For transactions involving only the rendition of
a professional skill64 such as an opinion or a design, the courts appear uniform
in upholding the rule of Gagne that the theories of implied warranty and strict
liability should not apply, leaving liability to turn on negligence. 65 When the
60. 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918); accord, Heise v. Gillette, 83 Ind. App. 551,
149 N.E. 182 (1925); Smith v. Carlos, 215 Mo. App. 488, 247 S.W. 468 (1923).
61. 120 N.E. at 409-10. The warranty implied was a fitness for the particular pur-
pose under the UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(1). 120 N.E. at 408.
62. Schuler v. Union News Co., 295 Mass. 350, 4 N.E.2d 465 (1936). See also
Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924). The New York Court of Ap-
peals in Temple agreed with Friend, saying that the implied warranty of fitness arose
out of the reliance of the buyer on the seller in the context of a restaurant transaction.
The Uniform Commercial Code has picked up the Friend line of decisions in § 2-
314(1). See note 17 supra.
63. But see McCarley v. Wood Drugs, Inc., 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (1934).
64. "A professional is one who continually must exercise intellectual judgment,
predicated upon high educational achievement, in the performance of his duties, and
whose clients rely upon that judgment." Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA.
L. REV. 627, 631 (1973). This writer goes on to note that a professional's skill in-
volves both mechanical and judgmental ability; the former includes a "mastery of routine
procedures," but the latter is the essential and distinctive quality of professionalism. Id.
at 633-45. See Note, Liability of Design Professionals-The Necessity of Fault, 58
IOWA L. REV. 1221 (1973) (this Note dissects the types of functions and duties of
designers).
65. In many of the professional service cases, the purchaser and the seller of the
service stand in privity. The absence of privity may raise some additional issues where,
for example, the plaintiff is an unforeseeable victim of the defendant's negligence. See
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (liability for injury
to intangible interests absent privity of contract is not allowed if the plaintiff's advantage
was only a collateral consideration); cf. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E.
275 (1922) (plaintiff was a foreseeable beneficiary of the transaction). This "end and
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language of warranty has been applied, it has only been to develop a war-
ranty to use due care.
[I]n the preparation of design and specifications as the basis of con-
struction, the engineer or architect "warrants" that he will or has exer-
cised his skill according to a certain standard of care, that he has acted
reasonably and without neglect. Breach of this "warranty" occurs if he
was negligent. Accordingly, the elements of an action for negligence
and for breach of the "implied warranty" are the same. The use of the
terms "implied warranty" in these circumstances merely introduces fur-
ther confusion into an area of law where confusion abounds. 66
Installation, Repair, and Construction. Nearest on the continuum to the pro-
fessional skills (opinion) cases are the instances of application of that skill
to a product in its installation or repair. In La Rossa v. Scientific Design
Co.,67 the Third Circuit, construing New Jersey law, denied recovery based
upon implied warranty when the plaintiff's decedent died of a latent cancerous
condition. The malignancy was allegedly triggered by dust which the decedent
inhaled while loading valadium pellets into a reactor which decedent's
employer had hired the defendant, Scientific Design, to install. There was
no absolute requirement, express or implied, for safe performance. In
addition to supervising the installation and the loading of the reactor, the
defendant had made and supplied the pellets. Neither strict liability nor im-
plied warranty was imposed since, as the court pointed out, the pellets were
dangerous, but apparently not defective. 68 More importantly, the court util-
ized a policy approach to the nature of the defendant's liability, finding
that this was a contract to render professional services which did not usually
lend itself to the usual factors familiar in the application of strict liability:
disparity of bargaining positions, including the necessary dependence upon a
manufacturer; difficulty of tracing back to an act of negligence somewhere in
the marketing chain; and a public policy of responsibility to consumers applied
against mass producers of goods.
aim" of the contract test was one of the factors considered by the California Supreme
Court in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958), where a notary negli-
gently drew up a will for the testator. The principle beneficiary recovered the difference
between the amount he would have taken under the will and his intestate share when
the will failed for improper attestation. Moral blame and deterrence figured into this
case-by-case approach to the privity issue since, by his actions, the notary was also guilty
of practicing law without a license. See Note, supra note 64, at 1223.
66. Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D.E. Britt Associates, Inc., 168 So.
2d 333, 335 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964). See also Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & As-
sociates, 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1972).
The professional service area is further highlighted by a comparison of two New York
cases involving the tort and contract statutes of limitations. In Carr v. Lipshie, 8 App.
Div. 2d 330, 187 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1959), aII'd, 9 N.Y.2d 983, 218 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1961),
an auditing firm failed to discover false entries made by the plaintiff's own bookkeeper.
It was held that the action was in tort (a three-year statute of limitations) and not in
contract (a six-year statute of limitations) in the absence of an express guarantee of
results. No duty attached to defendant's services beyond the duty of performance using
due care. The New York Court of Appeals in Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp.,
305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953), where the action was brought in implied war-
ranty for a suit sold by the defendant, which suit had caught fire, held that the longer
contract statute of limitations applied.
67. 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968); accord, Conway v. Marsh & McLennon, Inc., 34
App. Div. 2d 762, 310 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1970).
68. 402 F.2d at 941-42.
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It may be argued, however, that the installation contractor, especially one
creating some of the equipment installed, is in a better position to be familiar
with the particular hazards of his product, than is, for example, the retailer
dealing in pre-packaged goods. Additionally, the decedent in La Rossa did
not have any opportunity to choose his defendant;69 the reliance was forced
through the decedent's employment with the company contracting with the
defendant,70 and the decedent was at a disadvantage with respect to the
superior knowledge of the product possessed by the defendant.
Significantly, the defendant in La Rossa was engaged in a highly technical
area and the factual setting involved an element of professionalism. Also,
while the defendant's handling of a specific product may be questioned, the
product itself was non-defective. Installation of defective materials causing
injuries may lead to a liability without fault recovery. 71 Certainly, it would
appear that liability is more readily based on a tangible product, and under
the normal strict liability rules, a defective product. 72 A contractor, hired
for his skill or expertise, not placing a defective product in the chain of com-
merce is, at base, perhaps liable only for any negligence of his supervision.
This could be proven, if present.
Although the care involved in the installation of a product is a separate
consideration from the quality of the product itself, there is an apparently
separate area of repair service in which, at least arguably, the actions of a
repair agency in placing back into the hands of the consumer a product ren-
dered defective by the repair would be tantamount to the creation of a defec-
tive product. It would appear, at least superficially, that the defendant is
in the business of repairing products, and should be held to the standard of
the original manufacturer in the application of a similar skill to the product.
The repairman's skill generates a reliance by the public which is similar to
that created by the manufacturer. Likewise, by placing the defective product
on the market after repair he should arguably be responsible for injuries
caused by the product. Nevertheless, the majority rule would appear contrary
to such an analysis. 73 Although an action may exist on the breach of the
69. That the injured person is not the buyer or even the ultimate consumer, but a
mere bystander, should make no difference in the outcome. See Elmore v. American
Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969). But see RE-
STATEMENT § 402A, comment o.
70. The case may also be examined in the context of improper supervision and
workmen's compensation laws. See Note, supra note 64, at 1238-44.
71. Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 257 (1961). In this case, the buyer of a house with a faulty heating system had
recovered against the plaintiff in this action, the builder. The defendant was a subcon-
tractor who had laid defective pipe in the concrete floor, which had caused damage. The
builder sought to recover against the subcontractor. The transaction did not qualify as
a sale under the UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15, because the job and the materials were spe-
cially contracted for. However, the California Supreme Court, referring to the Gagne
case (notes 53-56 supra and accompanying text) held that a warranty for workmanlike
quality or for the materials existed by analogy. See also Farnsworth, supra note 18,
at 667, suggesting that analogous reasoning is preferable to a strained attempt to find
a sale in many transactions.
72. See RESTATEMENT § 402A; cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The Greenman test is similar to but
not identical with the strict liability test enunciated by the Restatement. See Cronin
v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
73. See Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833, 840(Alas. 1967), where the court said "where a person undertakes to render personal serv-
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contract to repair or for negligence, an additional action in implied warranty
would add nothing, in that the standard would appear to be a function of
reasonable care or negligence. 74  An act of commission in the repair of a
product pursuant to the sale and installation has in one case generated a strict
liability treatment, but the proximity of the repair and the sale and the iden-
tity of the seller and the repair agent may have been determinative. 75 It
would not be unjustified if a repair in the nature of a continuation of the
overall sale transaction incurred the higher responsibility of the status of mar-
keter, especially where the actor is the same.
Perhaps more realistically, the approach should be taken that, in the usual
case, the repair agent repairs only a part of the product and exercises control
as to that product only over his singular function. In contrast, the seller
either controls the design, components, and the total construction, or may
have indemnity against the one who does exercise such control. In other
words, as compared to the repair agent, the seller controls the entire product.
By the time the repairer enters the scene the product may be somewhat used
or deteriorated. In addition, since the consumer rather than the repairman
has chosen the product it follows that the repair agent has no option as to
the product he will replace on the market if he chooses to do the requested
repair. In all, the repair agent may be less of a target for the application
of liability without fault because the reliance on the product replaced into
a consumer's hands is lessened by virtue of the tenuous relationship of the
actor and the product; consequently, the marketing responsibility will have
a lesser foundation in such a repair transaction.
In Worrell v. Barnes76 the Supreme Court of Nevada held that a contrac-
tor hired to remodel an existing house was liable under strict liability and
implied warranty for his installation of a water heater and connecting gas
lines where a leak in the lines caused a fire.77 The court seemed to treat
the remodeled section of the house as a product within the strict liability rule
or as "goods" within the warranty for fitness for a particular purpose of the
ices he has the duty to perform such services in a workman-like manner." But see
Dodd v. Wilson, [1946] 2 All E.R. 691 (K.B.), where a veterinarian innoculated the
plaintiff's cattle with an impure drug. It was held that the plaintiff had an action
against the veterinarian for the breach of a warranty, or condition, of fitness. The court
continued, that the action arose outside of the English Sale of Goods Act, but where
an action was not within the Act, the common law warranties, from which the Act was
drawn, applied.
74. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833, 840 & n.23(Alas. 1967). The court cited the RESTATEMENT § 404: "'One who as an independent
contractor negligently makes, rebuilds or repairs a chattel for another is subject to the
same liability as that imposed upon negligent manufacturers of chattel.'" Id. at 840
n.22. Yet, the negligent manufacturer could easily be brought under the strict liability
of RESTATEMENT § 402A; the court refused to continue the analogy.
75. Woodrick v. Smith Gas Serv., Inc., 87 Ill. App. 2d 88, 230 N.E.2d 508 (1967);
see 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[4][b][vi] (rev. ed.
1973), in which it is recognized that the strict liability and implied warranty applications
may have stemmed from the additional position of the defendant as a retailer of the
device. However, the Woodrick court interpreted special interrogatories returned by thejury to mean that the product was not itself dangerous, but rather that it was made dan-
gerous by either the installation or the repair.
76. 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971).
77. The court did not indicate whether the gas leak was caused by faulty materials(some grounds for severance and a sales analogy) or by faulty workmanship (analogous
to the production of a product in place).
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Uniform Commercial Code. 78  Perhaps, the approach of this court was that
the contractor simply created and sold the "goods" or product in place.79
Certainly, the leading cases seem to include the builders of mass housing de-
velopments within the strict liability or implied warranty rule. 0 Mass con-
struction would seem to be the factor making the construction of dwellings
more analogous to the production and sale of chattel. It might seem to be
questionable to except the remodeler from the general rule for service con-
tracts and place him into the liability without fault category, unless it is real-
ized that this contractor is in the business of creating a particular product.
Is it any less fair to hold the remodeler to his defects than to hold a consumer
to a proof of negligence when it is obvious that the house has burned?8' On
the whole, a contract for construction is apparently more of a sale than a
mere contract for wages and labors.8 2
Medical and Related Services and Transfers. Perlmutter8 3 states the general
rule of disallowance of strict liability and implied warranty for medical treat-
ments and related services.84 Transfusions of impure blood (regarding the
transfer of blood from either the hospital or the blood bank), the use of de-
78. But cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105(1), which reads in part: "'Goods'
mean all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale .... "
79. It would seem, however, that unless the court merely considers a particular sys-
tem installed within a house, and does not continue in other cases to apply the same
reasoning to the house itself, the implied warranty is an analogy-although a perfectly
valid one-under the Uniform Commercial Code. This is apparent from the argument
of the court in Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 32 Cal. App. 3d 341, 108 Cal. Rptr.
174, 178 (1973), that UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607 regarding notice of breach
"should not be applied to transactions not involving goods." And, "the sale of immova-
ble improvements on real property" is not the sale of goods.
The warranty approach might avoid a shorter tort statute of limitations under strict
liability. The Pollard court noted that there was a close relationship between strict lia-
bility and implied warranty. "[T]he warranty formulation adds nothing except the com-
mercial relationship between the vendor and the injured. . . . Where that commercial
relationship in fact exists, it would seem that the benefit of a contract theory of recovery
should not be denied without an impelling reason." 108 Cal. Rptr. at 176. The court
of appeals opinion was vacated by the California Supreme Court. Pollard v. Saxe &
Yolles Dev. Co., 115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 525 P.2d 88 (1974). Although the supreme court
agreed that the common law implied warranties for the sale of new homes, there was
also to be a reasonable time in which the buyer must give notice as a counterpart to
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3). The plaintiffs delayed four years.
80. See Shipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Humber v. Mor-
ton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); cf. Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607,
77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969). Avner involved a defective lot on which defendant, a de-
veloper, had built. The defendants, soil engineer and developer, were held to have man-
ufactured the lot. A distinction can be drawn with the leading Calfornia case of Gagne
v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954), discussed in notes 53-56 supra and ac-
companying text, because in Avner the labor and skill were placed into the lot prior
to the sale to the plaintiff, indeed, during the manufacturing of the entire product. By
comparison, in Gagne the buyer (plaintiff) himself hired the soil engineer to discover
the quality of and render an opinion on the product.
81. The nature of the product may be an important factor. A home seems to have
a close connection to the person, an aura of necessity and perhaps, a greater likelihood
of a more significant personal loss. Cf. Cox v. Shaffer, 223 Pa. Super. 432, 302 A.2d
456 (1973) (a silo).
82. See Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200 (Super. Ct. 1970).
83. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text. Recovery for negligence is, of
course, allowed if the negligence exists and can be proven.
84. See also Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 120 N.J. Super. 529, 295 A.2d 363
(1973); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973) (recov-
ery may be had on the grounds of lack of informed consent).
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fective products in medical treatments, and the daily functions performed by
hospitals, have been considered essentially services or have been placed un-
der the heading of professional transactions; thus, such "services" were ex-
empted from strict liability recovery. Two trends away from this simplistic
classification are discernable. First, some transactions are regarded as sales,
imposing sales liability. Second, courts have begun to look to the reasons
for asserting strict liability, without regard to the mechanical tests for sales.
The latter policy approach would seem to be the sounder of the two.
Blood Transfusions and Impure Drugs. The blood transfusion cases in-
volve the basic fact situation of impure blood, frequently contaminated by
the largely undetectable and unpreventable serum hepatitis virus, transfused
into the patient, causing added illness or death. Liability may be sought
against either the hospital or the bloodbank. The court in Perlmutter, a case
involving a hospital's liability, applied the essence or main object test to the
transaction, holding it not to be a sale within the Uniform Sales Act; rather,
the transaction was a transfer incidental to the treatment of the patient.85
More recently, statutes have been passed removing any transfer of blood from
implied warranties.86 Prior to and in the absence of such statutes, some
courts have become more precise in their reasoning for the inclusion or exclu-
sion of blood transfers under the liability without fault doctrine. In contrast,
a New Jersey court in Brody v. Overlook Hospital,87 held blood to be a
"good," subject to the implied warranties of the Uniform Commercial Code
and to the rule of strict liability under the Restatement, section 402A. The
court reasoned that the application of strict liability against the hospital would
encourage hospitals generally to improve the blood collection process in the
blood banks and to step up research toward tests -to eliminate the impurities.
Moreover, the hospital, as opposed to the patient, was in the better position
to bear the cost of injury.88 In reversing the lower court,89 the appellate di-
vision relied on the distinction between a commercial and a medical-pro-
fessional activity, and upon the "unavoidably unsafe product" exception to the
Restatement." The court made it clear, however, that the decision was not
85. The dissent pointed out that Perlmutter did not involve an act by a member of
the staff which would be specifically a service; rather, it was a sale "for a specific con-
sideration [of] blood containing 'injurious substances, agents and impurities.'" Perlmut-
ter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 110, 123 N.E.2d 792, 797 (1954).
86. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1970); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 47-2-316(5) (Supp. 1973). See also McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 469 F.2d
230 (6th Cir. 1972); Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109
Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973). But see Rostocki v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So.
2d 475 (Fla. 1973) (case law prior to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.2-316(5) (Supp. 1974));
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 I11. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970) (case
law prior to ILL. REV. STAT. tit. 91, §§ 181-83 (Supp. 1974)). See also TEX. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. art. 2.316(e) (1968).
In a specific response to the possible application of one of the doctrines of liability
without fault, the Texas Legislature exempted hospitals, doctors and the like from liabil-
ity, except for negligence, in the transfusion, transplantation, and transfer of blood, or-
gans, and tissues. Blood banks receive this preferred status unless they make cash pay-
ments to the donors. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-3 (Supp. 1974).
87. 121 N.J. Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668 (1972).
88. 296 A.2d at 672-73.
89. Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (1974).
90. 317 A.2d at 395-97. See RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment k.
In arguing for the unavoidably unsafe category, the court looked to the facts that, at
the time of the trial, there were no known tests to detect the virus; that there was a
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to turn on a characterization of blood transfers as a sale or service. 91 Fur-
thermore, the court took the view that the application of strict liability is bet-
ter suited to the situation involving the mass-produced product which is
placed in the stream of commerce and promoted to the public through com-
mercial advertising, 92 than to the limited and necessitous professional rela-
tionship that existed in Brody.
Even though reliance, marketing and the possible redistribution basis may
be present, other courts have hesitated to apply liability without fault because
"a hospital is not engaged in the business of distributing blood to the public
and does not put the blood as a product on the market in order to profit
therefrom."93 The profit principle has been stressed as a part and parcel
of the risk distribution and ultimate responsibility of the profit maker in the
application of strict liability. Upon this basis it has been concluded that a
hospital is not in the business for the purpose of making a profit, but rather,
of helping the sick; accordingly, the application of strict liability is improper.9 4
In contrast, the social utility argument has sometimes failed with respect
to commercial blood banks because they do engage in the business of placing
a commodity on the market for a profit. Perhaps, the profit or non-profit
nature of the business should be controlling. 5 In Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis
War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc.96 the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the
logic of Perlmutter while appearing to regard two other factors with equal
importance. First, since serum hepatitis was an inherent and, by all scientific
means, unpreventable risk, the situation was a "matter of medical judgment
to determine whether in a particular case the benefits outweigh the risk."' 97
Therefore, blood must be available when a competent physician deems its
application necessary. 98 Second, the court, in denying recovery against the
very low incidence of the disease in blood; and that the medical necessity of use made
the blood not unreasonably dangerous. 317 A.2d at 397.
From another viewpoint, blood contaminated with the virus might not be considered
to fit the category of unavoidably unsafe products, which category is exempted from the
strict liability rule of the Restatement. A primary example of the unavoidably unsafe
product is the Pasteur treatment for rabies. This treatment has inherent dangers which
cannot be avoided. The Florida Supreme Court has so interpreted comment k, holding
impure blood to be defective even if the impurity is undetectable. Rostocki v. Southwest
Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973); see Community Blood Bank, Inc.
v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115, 118 (Fla. 1967) (special concurring opinion of Roberts, J.-
cited for support in Rostocki); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.
1963). But see Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn.
151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965). See also Comment, Serum Hepatitis Through Blood
Transfusions: A Wrong without a Remedy?, 24 Sw. L.J. 305, 322-24 (1970).
91. 317 A.2d at 394. Accord, Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 267
A.2d 867 (1970). " 'It seems to us a distortion to take what is, at least arguably, a
sale, twist it into the shape of a service, and then employ this transformed material in
erecting the framework of a major policy decision.'" 267 A.2d at 870.
92. 317 A.2d at 394.
93. Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 109 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135 (1973) (disallow-
ing recovery under either strict liability or implied warranty) (emphasis by the court).
94. Schuchman v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 9 UCC Rep. Serv, 637, 647 (Super. Ct.,
Balt. Co., Md., 1971).
95. But see Note, supra note 18, at 189. "It is just as easy for a non-profit blood
bank to insure against the risk as it is for a profit-making organization, and the fact
that the injury is unpreventable but foreseeable by the blood bank should be all the more
reason to require it to insure." Id.
96. 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).
97. 132 N.W.2d at 809.
98. See Comment, supra note 90, at 320-21. The author discusses the liability of
a physician for improper prescription, a liability based upon negligence.
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blood bank, seemed to take account of the fact that this blood bank was a
non-profit business. 99
Indeed, one New York court appeared to have distinguished Balkowitsch
as applicable to non-commercial rather than commercial blood banks;100 in
denying summary judgment for the blood bank the court regarded the blood
bank as a merchant dealing in goods sold for a price and, thus, raising the
possibility of an implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code. If
the blood bank's liability may be construed more broadly than a hospital's,
based on the closer analogy of a blood bank to a seller or manufacturer,
then at the least, the arguments applicable to a hospital in favor of the appli-
cation of liability without fault are applicable to a blood bank.' 0'
Interesting dicta of a federal court interpreting and predicting Vermont law
would seem to go one step farther in the area of products supplied in the
course of hospital treatments, indicating that defective drugs supplied inci-
dentally to the overall treatment would carry an implied warranty of fitness.
By the separation of the transactions, the general rule could be maintained
that negligence or intentional misconduct is the proper grounds where the in-
correct (but non-defective) drug is administered by the hospital staff.10 2
Defective Products. The courts have been less willing to apply strict
liability against professional medical services where defective products other
than drugs or blood have been employed. These cases often involve surgical
pins and hypodermic needles and the like which have broken while in the
patient.1 03 Tenuous distinctions can be drawn between blood sales and prod-
ucts such as needles which are used by the physician as his tools, and not
sold. The validity of the transaction-type distinction invites questioning.
99. "We find it difficult to give literal application of principles of law designed toimpose strict accountability in commercial transactions to a voluntary and charitable ac-
tivity which serves a humane and public health purpose." 132 N.W.2d at 811. "But
we cannot concede that defendant, which is a nonprofit corporation, should be treated
differently than a hospital or that it should be characterized as a commercial business
which offers its products for sale in the market place in competition with others for the
sole motive of making a profit." Id. at 810. See generally Note, supra note 18.
100. Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct., QueensCo.. 1969). This court, bound by the Perlmutter decision, distinguished the liability of
a hospital which was exempted from implied warranty, from that of the commercial
blood bank. not necessarily so exempted according to this court.
101. See, e.g., Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115, 119 (Fla.
1967) (special concurring opinion of Roberts, J.).
102. Mauran v. Mary Fletcher Hosp., 318 F. Supp. 297 (D. Vt. 1970). Contra, Shi-
vers v. Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 427 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968), error
ref. n.r.e. (a contaminated drug incurred neither strict liability nor implied warranty).
A federal district court in Wisconsin felt that strict liability might be applied on a
case-by-case basis to mechanical and administrative services of a hospital since such ser-
vices were not of the same inexact nature as the skills of professional physicians and
medical science, the patient had little control over the routine services of the hospital,
and the hospital was in the better position to spread the loss. Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973). But see Baptista v. Saint Barnabas Medi-
cal Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902, a/I'd, 57 N.J. 167, 270 A.2d 409 (1970);
Goelz v J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Institute & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1961), error ref. n.r.e. (employee's negligence).
103. See, e.g., Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr.
187 (1971) (policy of the RESTATEMENT § 402A not forwarded by application to a surgi-
cal needle which broke off in the plaintiff's hip); Dorfman v. Austenal, Inc., 3 UCC
Rep. Serv. 856 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co., N.Y., 1966) (surgical pin). But cf. Cheshire v.Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967). See




Obviously a surgical pin inserted in the patient for which a charge is made
resembles a sales transaction; the liability, however, seems to rest with the
manufacturer. 10 4 The general tendency is to deny the application of liability
without fault for the use or the transfer of defective instruments by the medi-
cal professional in the course of treatment.
Thus, when a dentist's hypodermic needle broke off in the plaintiff's jaw,
the lower court in Magrine v. Krasnica'0 5 refused to extend the rule of strict
liability to the dentist, partially because the dentist himself and not the pa-
tient was more similar to the user or consumer of the product. The court
did in fact characterize the transaction as the using of a tool upon, and not
the supplying of a product to, the patient.106 Perhaps a more solid logic was
formulated by the court in discussing the strict liability implication derived
from the blood transfusion cases. The court felt that in such cases the con-
trolling factor exempting the hospitals from strict liability would not be the
sales-service distinction; rather, it would be simply that the assurance of the
purity of the blood was impossible. 1°7 Even if a true seller in the market
place might be burdened with this risk marketing responsibility, the greater
need for the services and continued existence of a hospital, or doctor, as con-
trasted with the utility of the proverbial widget maker, would be a counter-
vailing policy consideration. Also, because a large corporation, in contradis-
tinction to a single dentist, might spread its risks over thousands of customers,
the lone dentist has a much narrower risk distribution basis for the application
of a strict liability rule. 108 The court in Magrine felt that it would be incon-
sistent to hold that for his skill a doctor or dentist would be liable only for
"negligent deviation from the standards of his profession," but that for em-
ploying a tool, not obviously defective, the dentist would be liable without
such negligence. 1 9
In a thorough dissent to the per curiam affirmance of Magrine at the inter-
mediate appellate level,110 it was noted that a patient desiring to recover
against the manufacturer for such an injury would be placed at a disadvan-
tage by having to demonstrate that the care and use of the instrument while
under the control of the dentist was not the proximate cause of the injury,
and conversely, that a defect existing at the time the product left the manu-
facturer was the cause of the injury. In addition, the appellate dissent
pointed out that the occasional seller and the non-seller were exempted from
strict liability not so much because the transaction backed the nature of a tech-
104. See Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960).
While the plaintiff may be able to recover against the manufacturer of the pin or the
rod, it may be left to the jury to decide whether the pin was actually defective, or the
physician used, perhaps, too small a pin, or the plaintiff put too great a stress on the
pin. See McKasson v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 12 Ill. App. 3d 429, 299 N.E.2d 38 (1973).
105. 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (L. Div. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom.
Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), afJ'd, 53 N.J.
259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
106. 227 A.2d at 543-44.
107. Id. at 544-45.
108. Id. at 545-46. Could he not insure? But, ought he be so obliged?
109. Id. at 546.




nical "sale," but rather, 'because the "buyer" or the user had no reason to
rely on the "seller."'' Yet, would one not rely on a physician or dentist
more than on the seller at the modern supermarket? 1" 2
A necessary concomitant of the application of strict liability concepts to
the medical area is an increase in the cost of medical services. Accordingly,
two questions would appear to be decisive: first, can the doctor, hospital, or
blood bank pass along the costs, that is redistribute? Second, does the accep-
tance of the redistribution theory by society at large render the increased costs
of such services beyond the reach of a needful minority? It was the neces-
sity for medical treatment that in the first instance distinguished blood and
medical tools from goods, countervailing the policy of protection of the con-
sumer from the defective product by reallocation of the risk to the marketer.
Commercial Services. If the defendant is not engaged in a profession but
is, rather, engaged in a more commercial service such as the operation of a
beauty shop, the courts have recently been more apt to hold that proof of
negligence is not required. 1  The leading case is Newmark v. Gimbel's,
Inc.," 4 in which the plaintiff received a permanent wave from one of defend-
ant's operators. The solution used caused this particular customer's hair to
fall out and her scalp to blister. The plaintiff had relied on the skills of the
beautician in choosing the solution to be used; the solution, a name brand
product, was applied as part of the commercial skill; hence, the solution en-
tered into the stream of commerce as surely as if the plaintiff had purchased
it from a store's shelf. An argument of no-technical-sale should not apply.
Beyond this simple sales-service dichotomy, the element of professionalism
distinguishes, for example, the dentist or doctor from the non-professional be-
cause the essence of the professional's function should be regarded as the fur-
nishing of opinions and services. 1 5 The court continued the contrast of pro-
fessional and non-professional services emphasizing social utility: "The na-
ture of the [medical-professional] services, the utility of and the need for
them, involving as they do, the health and even survival of many people, are
so important to the general welfare as to outweigh in the policy scale any
need for the imposition on dentists and doctors of the rules for strict liability
in tort." 1 6 For commercial services, however, not involving such counter-
vailing policy arguments, strict liability or implied warranty under the Uni-
111. 241 A.2d at 642 n.9.
112. It does not offend our sense of justice to place the loss on the one respon-
sible for the instrument. The law has done this very thing throughout its
history. Justice requires only that we apply the rule in appropriate cases.
A retailer who sells a can of beans containing a latent defect is no more
culpable than a dentist who uses an instrument with a latent defect. The
patient probably places more reliance upon the dentist then he does on the
retailer. . . . It is not unjust to hold a dentist to the same responsibility.
Id. at 644.
113. See Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965). But see Epstein
v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. Fairfax Co. 1963) (stating
an older rule which denied liability without fault in beauty shop-service-transac-
tions).
114. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).




form Commercial Code is applicable to the furnisher of such services who
takes a product from the chain of commerce and applies it to a patron. Al-
though this result should be the case with or without a technical sale of the
product, such -a provider of services can be said to occupy the position of a
retailer. 117 The present state of the law seems to lend itself to rather anom-
alous results. For example, if a scalp conditioner were applied by a derma-
tologist as a treatment, absent negligence, his patient would have no cause
of action against him. But, if a skilled beautician, with long experience, were
to apply the same solution to his client, he would be strictly liable for an
injury proximately caused by such application (although the beautician might
have an indemnity action against the manufacturer)." 8 To say that the doc-
tor is charged only with the rendering of an opinion, which carries a public
awareness of its limitations, may be an insufficient answer. Assuming a de-
fective product, it is the product that causes the injury and not the opinion
or skill of the individual. The public access to the service decreases as the
costs of the service increase. This can be said for any service or product,
where the redistributed costs under the liability without fault theory are re-
flected in the price of the product. But, as -the Newmark court pointed out,
the commercial transactions do not occupy the same degree of necessity as
do the medical -and some related professional transactions.
If this aproach is applied to blood banks,1 9 the justification for strict li-
ability or implied warranty treatment, even with regard to commercial banks,
would seem to disappear. Yet, in a sense the blood bank is a manufacturer
or producer of a product, and especially the banks operating for a profit are
in the business of that particular product. One rationalization, although it
may be no more than that, is that some courts feel that it is possible to use the
increased potentiality of liability as an impetus to encourage a better blood
bank product. In comparison, the sole physician, dealing with a prepack-'
aged tool is as surprised as his patient at resultant injuries from hidden de-
fects, and so a greater liability potential could not serve to increase his
care.' 20  The additional factor of a larger redistribution basis in a marketing
or manufacturing concern as compared to the sole practitioner needs also to
be stressed. Clearly, no single factor distinguishes the professional and com-
mercial cases where the defendants' skills and judgments are applied to the
product in the immediate transfer to the consumer.
Bailments and Other Quasi-Sales. Within the commercial transaction cate-
gory, and perhaps more nearly a sale than the other hybrids, are the bail-
ments and similar "quasi-sales" such as licensing. In the bailment situation,
as will be observed, the chattel bailed is placed into the stream of commerce
117. Id. at 704.
118. Although the doctor's patient might have a cause against the manufacturer,
proof problems such as the continued purity of the product and the method of applica-
tion of the product might arise. See note 104 supra. See also McKasson v. Zimmer
Mfg. Co., 12 111. App. 3d 429, 299 N.E.2d 38 (1973).
119. See notes 95-101 supra and accompanying text.
120. Cf. Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668, 674 (L. Div.
1972), rev'd, 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (App. Div. 1974).
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and into the consumer's possession just as certainly as if there had been a
technical sale.' 2 1
In Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service12 2 the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a bailor for hire (lessor) who transferred the posses-
sion of a truck in exchange for the payment of rental was liable for subse-
quent injuries resulting from a defect in the braking system. The liability
was in implied warranty and strict liability, analogous, respectively, to the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement, section 402A. 123 In Cin-
trone, when the plaintiff's employer rented the truck from Hertz and placed
plaintiff in the passenger's seat, the rental agreement contemplated continu-
ing and comprehensive servicing and maintenance. The bailee, its employee,
and apparently, the public at large, all bearing the initial risk of foreseeable
injury through a breach of the bailor's duty to keep his product fit for opera-
tion, may rely upon a responsibility assumed by the bailor for hire when he
placed his product in the chain of commerce.' 24 Interestingly, the court
noted that the warranty is "not dependent upon existence of Hertz' addi-
tional undertaking to service and maintain the trucks while they were leased.
[However,] [t]hat undertaking serves particularly to instill reliance in
[plaintiff's employer] upon mechanical operability of the trucks throughout
the rental period.' 25 The warranty in Cintrone arose from the rental agree-
ment itself, and not from the service arrangement. Yet, the continuing serv-
ice features of the contract loomed large to induce and justify the reliance
upon the defendant and his position in the commercial chain. As the court
noted, this reliance, in turn, is elemental in the creation of the seller's market-
ing responsibility. 2
In Cintrone it would appear that the type of transaction did not control
as much as the reality of the situation in -terms of induced reliance and the
marketing responsibility generated by Hertz' advertising messages, and, of
course, by the marketing of its product. This approach is borne out by other
courts which disregarded the transactions' forms, looking rather to respon-
sibility for placing the product on the market, and to the reliance by the pur-
chasing public. For example, a bailment need not be for hire, but need only
involve the loan of equipment for the purposes of acquainting the plaintiff or
his employer with a newer model of a particular machine in the bailor's hopes
of generating future sales. 12 7  Similarly, a bailment of roller skates at a
state-owned roller-rink which charged admission has given rise to an implied
121. See Phipps, supra note 52, at 278.
122. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); accord, Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237
F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722,
85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d
446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969) (commercial bailment of a defective ladder); Stang v.
Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
123. By analogous reasoning, the strictures of the no-technical-sale argument can be
avoided.
124. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769.
777-78, 781 (1965). ;
125. 212 A.2d at 778.
126. Id. at 776 n.l.
127. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964).
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warranty standard without the necessity of proof of negligence; 12 the court
here termed it a "bailor-bailee relationship for mutual benefit."'1 29
Differing from the bailment is the license, which grants permission to do
a particular thing or to exercise a certain privilege. 13 0 When a customer en-
tered a self-service launderette and was injured when a washing machine
malfunctioned, it was held that although the customer was a licensee and
not a bailee,131 the licensor was in the same position (as a bailor and was re-
sponsible for a defective product placed by him before the public. 13 2  The
rules of strict liability applied to such a responsibility. Courts are in conflict,
and another jurisdiction has applied only the standard of the exercise of due
care where injuries were received in a situation involving "an abstract right
to occupy" a space on defendant's malfunctioning ferris wheel. The right
was, in that case, distinguished from a sale or transfer of possession. 133
B. An Analysis
As a preliminary summary, one may readily conclude that courts appear
willing to allow recovery under liability without fault for transfers of defective
chattels, with a marked tendency to place 'homes within the same general
rule. In contrast, the purchaser of -an opinion relies merely on the fact that
he bargained for no more than the "seller's" best efforts and judgment. From
this, a professional dealing in merchandise need not be excluded from strict
liability or implied warranty merely because of his professional status; but,
especially as in the case of doctors and other medical professionals of a hos-
pital staff, the public need for access to medical treatment outweighs the so-
cietal commitment to protect the individual through reallocation and redis-
tribution of the risk. The benchmarks upon which decisions should be pre-
mised are reliance, marketing responsibility, and ability to reallocate the bur-
den without colliding with the public interest. The courts, in -their search
for -a ratio decidendi, should look beyond mere word categorizations such as
"commercial" or "professional."
In Barbee v. Rogers'34 the Texas Supreme Court refused to apply a liabil-
ity without fault doctrine in the prescription and sale of contact lenses, hold-
128. Covello v. State, 17 Misc. 2d 637, 187 N.Y.S.2d 396, 402-03 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
Such warranties have sometimes been limited to the standard of reasonable care. See,
e.g., 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 75, at § 19.02[2]; W. PROSSER, supra
note 1, § 95, at 638. After Newmark and Cintrone, there would appear to be little
room to argue for a different treatment of bailments for hire or "mutual benefit" than
of sales. Cf. Farnsworth, supra note 18, at 655-60.
129. 187 N.Y.S.2d at 402. A bailment for mutual benefit may have a broader mean-
ing than a bailment for hire. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4, 6 n.1 (2d Cir.
1964).
130. Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 324, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420, 422 (1970).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 324-26, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 423. "The precise legal relationship between the
parties has not played a particularly significant role in the cases imposing strict liabil-
ity." Id. at 325, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
133. Shaw v. Fairyland at Harvey's, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 576, 271 N.Y.S.2d 70(1966); cf. Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969), in which
the manufacturer of a rubber bathmat, which slipped while plaintiff was standing on it
in the co-defendant's hotel, was liable, but the innkeeper placing the mat in the tub and
renting the room was held not to be a seller under the RESTATEMENT § 402A. The
invitor-invitee relationship that did exist implied only a duty of reasonable care.
134. 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968).
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ing that the optometry firm was engaged in a professional service apparently
requiring care, but not a skill going to the production of a defect-free prod-
uct. Yet, in truth, it was a product that was delivered to the plaintiff. In
Barbee plaintiff purchased his contact lenses from the defendants, a partner-
ship, .after being examined by one of the 125 licensed optometrists employed
in one of the defendants' eighty-four state-wide offices. The lenses were
manufactured by Texas State Optical, Inc.,'15 a corporation established to
manufacture the lenses for the partnership after the lenses were prescribed
for the partnership's clients.
The contact lenses [were] sold for the same price regardless of the diffi-
culty or the simplicity of the eye problems and ithe number of subse-
quent examinations which [might] be required. The charge [was] made
for the product and not for the time of the optometrist. [Defend-
ants warranted] -to those responding to their [newspaper, radio, and
television] advertisements of contact lenses that they [would] be prop-
erly cared for and fitted . .. .16
Although the lenses prescribed, sold, and fitted by the partnership were found
to be not of the proper curvature and as a result had scratched the plaintiff's
cornea, the court refused to apply strict liability. In finding the relationship
to be in essence a professional service, the court based its holding partially
on a statutory distinction between a licensed optometrist and a "mere mer-
chant" who sells prepared spectacles without fitting or prescription.3 7  The
court, in addition, seemed to distinguish a defective product to which the Re-
statement, section 402A 138 would apply, from a product not in itself defec-
tive, yet specifically made for an individual customer, and which, when ap-
plied in the condition prescribed and sold, would injure that customer.139
135. A take-nothing judgment in favor of the corporation in district court was not
appealed. The court of civil appeals found for the partnership, reversing the trial court.
The jury findings in the district court were confusing, however; the partnership was ap-
parently found to have breached an implied warranty, such breach being the proximate
cause of the injury. Texas State Optical, Inc. v. Barbee, 417 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1967).
136. Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. 1968).
137. Id. at 345. The court referred to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 4552, 4565d,
e, 4566 (1960), which define optometry as a professional calling to be distinguished
from a mere merchant. These statutes have been recodified as id. arts. 4552-1.01 to
-6.04 (1974). Note that these articles are under title 71 regarding public health and
including the requirements for nurses, chiropractors, dentists, and those who sell hearing
aids. This is not a sales statute. Id. art. 4552-5.09 prohibits an optometrist from using
misleading advertising.
138. Texas adopted RESTATEMENT § 402A in McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967), which case did not involve a technical sale; rather, the defec-
tive product was a free sample distributed to induce future sales. Yet, in Barbee the
same court refused to extend strict liability because the lenses "were not a finished prod-
uct offered to the general public in regular channels of trade." Barbee v. Rogers, 425
S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968). See Hill, How Strict is Strict?, 32 TEx. B.J. 759, 767(1969). But cf. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 1, 8-9
(1969).
139. The court of appeals decision, Texas State Optical, Inc. v. Barbee, 417 S.W.2d
750 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967), did not distinguish between the partnership and
the corporation, the former fitting, prescribing and selling, the latter manufacturing from
the prescription. The defect, if it existed, was in the service (by the partnership) and
not in the technique or the materials of the manufacturing. The dissent argued that
all elements for implied warranty were present: vendor's knowledge of the proposed use,
the vendee's reliance on the vendor's superior skill, the vendor's position as both the
manufacturer and seller, and the privity of contract. "The need for skill and judgment
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This distinction was linked with the professional nature of the partnership's
operation and the concomitant responsibility to exercise merely the standard
of care of the profession. In Barbee the best argument must be that of pro-
fessional standing; yet, applying the essence test and considering the one
price, mass advertising approach of the company, one strains to approximate
the policy concerns motivating the New York Court of Appeals in Perlmut-
ter and the New Jersey court in Magrine.140
In a comparison with the hair-wave and beauty shop cases, one would
think the equities at least as strong in the plaintiff's favor in Barbee. Con-
sider Newmark, where the treatment was defective for that particular plain-
tiff, and the service agent's "skill" contributed to the injury through the selec-
tion of the product. The beauty shop operator distributed the product to the
plaintiff, the customer. In the same way, the optometrist in Barbee not only
distributed but manufactured the lenses and was totally responsible for the
product. Another Consideration is that the skill applied in Barbee was per-
haps more mechanical than judgmental.1 4 1 Above all, members of the legal or
medical profession do not advertise in the commercial fashion of the defend-
ants in Barbee. A defendant setting out to represent himself as a mass seller
in a highly desirable product area, using every advertising "come-on," should
be treated as such when he fails to deliver the quality product he proclaims
and thereby causes physical injury to the customer.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unless the useful tools of strict liability and implied warranty are extended
beyond the traditional sales transaction, the plaintiff must account for a prod-
uct after it has left the manufacturer's control, or he must trace down a dis-
tant seller or supplier, bypassing, of necessity, the immediate parties who
applied the defective product. 4 2  Equally affected is the customer who relies
on specially designed products, yet is excluded by the professional status of
the designer from even the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and
from strict liability recovery. But, reasoning by analogy is not a word game
in which the plaintiff attempts to show that his defendant acted similarly to
an actor held liable under a parallel set of rules. Rather, strict liability (in-
on the part of the vendor is an element tending to create rather than negate the existence
of an implied warranty." Id. at 752. The essence test and the commercial versus pro-
fessional status issue were apparently disregarded with the emphasis placed, perhaps, on
an analogy to the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose. See Keeton, supra note 138, at 7-8.
140. See Comment, supra note 64, at 636, suggesting the mechanical or routine oper-
ations of the professional be distinguished from his judgment based on knowledge. Thus,
the doctor does not represent himself to be able to cure a patient's ills. Perhaps, how-
ever, "when the service performed is in connection with the making of a product to fit
the needs of a particular individual," the professional's operation becomes less of a prog-
nosticating service and more of a manufacturing trade. See Keeton, supra note 138, at
8. To be sure, Professor Keeton did not unqualifiedly support application of strict liabil-
ity to the Barbee situation; yet, he recognized that justified reliance followed by frus-
trated expectations, the potential harm in the product, and the capacity of the defend-
ants-suppliers to redistribute the losses were all present for potential application of lia-
bility without fault. Id. at 8-9.
141. See Comment, supra note 64, at 633-45.
142. See generally Farnsworth, supra note 18.
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cluding implied warranty) is a policy decision with given and established cri-
teria; it does nothing to further the general policies of strict liability to apply
such liability to whomever is closest in space and time to the plaintiff. 143
In his landmark concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.14 4
Justice Traynor outlined several considerations for the use of the strict lia-
bility doctrine. The defendant should be in the chain placing the product
on the market or into use. This position within the chain attaches a respon-
sibility to make the product safe. The responsibility may be discharged by
guarding against known hazards of the product, by anticipation of future risks
of use, and by insuring against all risks of use incurred by consumers in all
but misuse of the product. The costs of such insurance or, in the alternative,
the costs borne by the seller in settling with an injured consumer can be
passed along to the public at large through the price of the article sold. In-
herent in these principles must be the additional factor of reliance by the con-
suming public on the product (perhaps, merely by its presence in the market-
place) and, therefore, on the seller. This reliance factor would, of course,
lend itself to the creation of the initial responsibility. 145
To effect either a control over the product (a deterrent theory) or a position
to insure oneself against and redistribute the risk of loss among the general
public (risk redistribution theory),146 the defendant must usually be in the
business of dealing with the supply, distribution, or sale of the product. This
is important because he must be able to distribute the costs to the public by
simply raising the price of the particular product.
Given these criteria, if an individual is in the business of giving his studied
opinion about an unknown element, in the absence of an express warranty,
the purchaser of this opinion should not be allowed to recover upon the basis
of implied warranty or strict liability. 147 However, implied warranty should
apply when an opinion or expert skill is a component part of a product mar-
keted and used by the ultimate consumer. The purchase price is paid for
the final product rather than for the opinion or skill of the professional which
was utilized in its preparation. 48  However, when the product is applied in
a medical treatment situation, substantial policy considerations must be reck-
oned with. Even where the product itself is defective and is applied to the
plaintiff in the course of a treatment, the obvious reliance on the profes-
sional and his place in the "stream of commerce" must be weighed against
143. See Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539, 547 (1967).
144. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion).
145. Reliance is not an element of proof for the warranties of merchantable quality.
Prosser, supra note 14, at 149; cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315 (fitness for
a particular purpose, requiring reliance). See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note
17, § 9-9, at 297. Rather, the concept of reliance for implied warranty (of merchanta-
bility) and strict liability is part of the policy basis for establishing the strict liability
doctrine in the first place. See RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment f.
146. The redistribution theory is probably the better, or at least the more important,
of the two. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 25, at 1120; Note, supra note 18, at 188. See
generally Pound, supra note 2.
147. See, e.g., Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
148. See Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969)
(soil engineer and developer held to manufacture lot); Keeton, supra note 138, at 9;
Phipps, supra note 52, at 276-77.
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the overall detriment to the public in increased medical costs, resulting from
liability without fault. 149 Should large, commercial hospitals enjoy the same
benefits? Or commercial blood banks? The plaintiff in Magrine who was
injured by the defective needle had some chance of reaching the manufac-
turer; yet, who can the infected hospital patient reach when the blood bank
itself is immune from liability without fault? Such a patient is totally de-
pendent on the supplier, the seller; the reliance is forced and only the supplier
can redistribute the costs. Certainly, the liability without fault approach
should apply to a supplier of professional services who conducts himself as
a common seller by bombarding the public with his commercial message, and
who does everything he can to induce complete reliance in his skills. This
should be so especially where the very skill advertised makes the client (con-
sumer) and the product incompatible.
Assuming that, with exceptions, the majority of courts are accepting the
insurance or redistribution idea' 50-making society as a whole bear the costs
of injuries of each when the injured party is not himself the cause of his
woe-the law may go farther and hunt out, on a case-by-case basis,' 5 ' this
"involuntary Good Samaritan"15 2 who will be first in line to shoulder the
costs. In each case, the courts should be careful that word-game analogies
do not create a greater burden than the one they intended to alleviate. The
policies to be balanced would seem to be justified reliance, marketing respon-
sibility, and the ability to readjust the burden so acquired. An additional
element, in the proper case, is the countervailing need of the public to main-
tain general economic access to the service or product, which access might
be interrupted by the imposition of liability without fault.
149. Cf. Note, supra note 47, at 125-26.
In Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971), a doctor ad-
ministering a pure drug that proved to be harmful to his patient was held not to be lia-
ble without fault. It was held that he was not in the business of selling drugs, but
merely for his skill and opinions. The same rule apparently applied to a hospital that
administered a contaminated drug. See Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 427
S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
150. Pound, supra note 2, at 8.
151. See Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
Certainly, cases may be grouped by their facts with a uniform result, but when the ac-
tors change, courts should be aware that the overall policies for the imposition of strict
liability may have also changed in weight and alignment.
152. Pound, supra note 2, at 11-12. For a kinder view, from 10 years after, see
Pound supra note 35, at 185: "Must not for our principle be one of repair of injuries
incurred rather than inflicted?"
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